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I. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE 
This year’s topic focuses on effective and ethical pre-filing strategies 
for investigating and pleading securities fraud class action claims.  This 
is an important subject in the field of securities litigation.  The failure to 
survive a motion to dismiss based on deficient pleading of claims 
alleged in a federal securities class action results in the end of the 
litigation (when such motion is granted with prejudice).1  This obstacle, 
however, presents only part of the story.  Today, due to developments 
that are addressed in this Article, plaintiffs institute federal securities 
class actions against fewer types of defendants as contrasted with the 
situation two decades ago. 
The option to institute the class action in state court ordinarily is 
 
* Rupert and Lillian Radford Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law.  I wish to 
thank the Loyola University Chicago School of Law for inviting me to present at its Annual 
Institute for Investor Protection.  In particular, I extend my appreciation to Professor Michael 
Kaufman for his friendship and support throughout the decades of our academic careers as well as 
to Professors Charles Murdock and Steven Ramirez for their courtesy. 
1. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2012) (setting forth pleading requirements in private actions 
brought for alleged violation of the Act); FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (requiring that fraud be pleaded 
with particularity); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (seeking a court order to dismiss the complaint “for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted”). 
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unavailable: The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act 
(“SLUSA”)2 generally preempts state law with respect to securities 
class actions3 involving nationally traded securities4 (with the exception 
of specified misconduct in the context of tender offers, going private 
transactions, mergers, and the exercise of appraisal rights).5  As a 
consequence, except for alleged improprieties in the merger and 
acquisition setting, securities class actions filed in state court arise today 
only with respect to securities that are not nationally traded.6  
 
2. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 1 (1998) 
(Conf. Rep.). 
3. Class actions are defined more broadly under SLUSA than under Rule 23 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  Pursuant to SLUSA, a “covered class action” means: 
(i) any single lawsuit in which— 
(I) damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 persons or prospective class 
members, and questions of law or fact common to those persons or members of the 
prospective class, without reference to issues of individualized reliance on an alleged 
misstatement or omission, predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
persons or members; or 
(II) one or more named parties seek to recover damages on a representative basis on 
behalf of themselves and other unnamed parties similarly situated, and questions of law 
or fact common to those persons or members of the prospective class predominate over 
any questions affecting only individual persons or members; or 
(ii) any group of lawsuits filed in or pending in the same court and involving common 
questions of law or fact, in which – 
(I) damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 persons; and 
(II) the lawsuits are joined, consolidated, or otherwise proceed as a single action for 
any purpose. 
15 U.S.C. §§ 78bb(f)(5)(B)(i)–(ii) (amending section 16(f)(2)(A) of the Securities Act and section 
28(f)(5)(B) of the Exchange Act). 
4. The term “nationally traded security” or “covered security” is defined as a security that 
meets the standards set forth in section 18(b) of the Securities Act.  Id. § 77r(b)(1).  These 
securities include those that are listed for trading on the New York Stock Exchange and the 
Nasdaq Stock Market.  Id.  Securities issued by registered investment companies also are defined 
as nationally traded securities.  Id. § 77r(b)(2). 
5. See id. § 78bb(f)(3)(A)(ii)(II)(bb) (amending section 16(d)(1) of the Securities Act and 
section 28(f)(3)(A) of the Exchange Act).  In addition, SLUSA excludes from federal preemption 
suits instituted by a state, a political subdivision thereof, or a state pension plan provided that 
such state, political subdivision thereof, or state pension plan is named as a plaintiff in such action 
and has authorized its participation in such action.  See id. § 78bb(f)(3)(B)(i) (amending section 
16(d)(2) of the Securities Act and section 28(f)(3)(B) of the Exchange Act).  As another 
exception, “a covered class action that seeks to enforce a contractual agreement between an issuer 
and an indenture trustee may be maintained in a State or Federal court by a party to the agreement 
or a successor to such party.”  Id. § 78bb(f)(3)(C) (amending section 16(d)(3) of the Securities 
Act and section 28(f)(3)(C) of the Exchange Act). 
6. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006) (holding that 
SLUSA preempts state law holder class action claims of the type alleged in the complaint at bar).  
See generally JAMES HAMILTON & TED TRAUTMANN, SECURITIES LITIGATION UNIFORM 
STANDARDS ACT OF 1998: LAW AND EXPLANATION (1998); Lisa L. Casey, Shutting the Doors to 
State Court: The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 27 SEC. REG. L.J. 141 
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Accordingly, with respect to nationally traded companies, plaintiffs 
ordinarily are relegated to instituting solely derivative and individual 
actions in state court alleging state law and concurrent federal law 
causes of action.7 
As another obstacle, the heightened “strong inference” pleading 
requirement set forth in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995 (“PSLRA”)8 obligates a plaintiff in a securities fraud action to 
plead “with particularity both the facts constituting the alleged 
violation, and the facts evidencing scienter, i.e., the defendant’s 
intention ‘to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.’”9  When undertaking this 
task, a court must assess not only the inferences drawn by the plaintiff 
but also competing inferences that rationally arise from the facts alleged 
in the complaint.10  As the Supreme Court reasoned: 
An inference of fraudulent intent may be plausible, yet less cogent 
than other, nonculpable explanations for the defendant’s conduct.  To 
qualify as “strong” within the intendment of [the PSLRA], we hold, an 
inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reas-
onable—it must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing 
inference of nonfraudulent intent.11 
 
(1999); David M. Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act 
of 1998: The Sun Sets on California Blue Sky Laws, 54 BUS. LAW. 1 (1998); Richard W. Painter, 
Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1998). 
7. See 15 U.S.C. § 77bb(f)(5)(C) (amending section 16(f)(2)(B) of the Securities Act and 
section 28(f)(5)(C) of the Exchange Act) (stating that “the term ‘covered class action’ does not 
include an exclusively derivative action brought by one or more shareholders on behalf of a 
corporation”).  For the definition of “covered class action,” see supra note 3.  The Securities Act 
allows for concurrent jurisdiction while the Securities Exchange Act provides exclusive federal 
court jurisdiction.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78v(a) (Securities Act); id. § 78aa(a) (Exchange Act). 
8. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
9. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007).  A plaintiff 
instituting a securities fraud action under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, pursuant 
to the PSLRA, must adhere to the following: (1) A requirement that a plaintiff in the complaint in 
any private securities fraud action alleging material misstatements and/or omissions “specify each 
statement alleged to have been misleading; the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading; 
and if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information and belief, the 
complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed;” (2) A requirement 
that in any private action under the 1934 Act in which the plaintiff 
may recover money damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a particular 
state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each such act or omission alleged to 
violate the [1934 Act], state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference 
that the defendant acted with the required state of mind. 
15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(b)(1)–(2). 
10. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322−23. 
11. Id. at 314.  Notably, the collective scienter and group published doctrines have been 
rejected by the majority of lower courts, making the plaintiff’s task to plead fraud under the 
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These heightened pleading requirements, as well as the enhanced 
“plausibility” pleading standard embraced by the Supreme Court with 
respect to non-fraud claims,12 signify that fewer securities class actions 
will survive the motion to dismiss stage.  With the PSLRA’s mandate 
that (absent exceptional circumstances) all discovery must be stayed 
pending the subject court’s decision on a motion to dismiss,13 plaintiffs 
frequently are challenged to marshal the requisite facts and strong 
inference of fraudulent intent to proceed with the litigation. 
II. STATISTICAL EVIDENCE 
Statistics illustrate this challenge as securities class actions are 
dismissed with regularity by the federal district courts.  For example, in 
2012, 47% of motions to dismiss were granted.14  In addition, 17% of 
these motions were granted (and denied) in part, 5% were granted 
without prejudice, and 15% were voluntarily dismissed by claimants.15  
Taking into account that 14% of motions to dismiss were denied in their 
entirety (plus the 17% of cases in which motions were denied in part), 
 
PSLRA with the requisite particularity against corporate insiders more difficult.  The group 
published doctrine provides that statements contained in group-published documents, such as 
periodic Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) reports filed by an issuer, are attributable 
to officers and directors who have daily involvement in normal company operations.  For cases 
rejecting the group published doctrine, see, e.g., Winer Family Trust v. Queen, 503 F.3d 319, 337 
(2d Cir. 2007) (citing cases rejecting group published doctrine); Southland Sec. Corp. v. InSpire 
Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 364−65 (5th Cir. 2004) (same).  Likewise, the collective 
scienter theory has been largely rejected.  See, e.g., Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, 697 (7th 
Cir. 2008) (opining that “the corporate scienter inquiry must focus on the state of mind of the 
individual corporate official or officials who make or issue the statement . . . rather than generally 
to the collective knowledge of all the corporation’s officers and employees”).  But see Glazer 
Capital Mgmt. LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736, 744 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that “in certain 
circumstances, some form of collective scienter might be appropriate”). 
12. The liberal “no set of facts” pleading standard embraced by the Supreme Court in Conley 
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45−46 (1957), for non-fraud claims (under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure) has been abandoned by the Court in favor of plausibility pleading that 
requires claimants to plead “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”  
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 575 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see id. at 
548−70 (majority opinion); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (holding that 
respondent’s complaint failed to plead sufficient facts).  See generally Marc I. Steinberg & Diego 
Gomez-Cornejo, Blurring the Lines Between Pleading Doctrines: The Enhanced Rule 8(a)(2) 
Plausibility Standard Converges With the Heightened Fraud Pleading Standards Under Rule 9(b) 
and the PSLRA, 30 REV. LITIG. 1 (2010) (discussing the Supreme Court’s enhancement of the 
pleading standard). 
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B). 
14. RENZO COMOLLI, SUKAINA KLEIN, RONALD I. MILLER & SVETLANA STARYKH, NERA 
ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: 2012 FULL-
YEAR REVIEW 16 (2013) [hereinafter NERA REVIEW], available at http://www.nera.com/nera-
files/PUB_Year_End_Trends_2012_1113.pdf. 
15. Id. 
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these statistics signify that approximately 31% of federal securities class 
actions proceeded in 2012 beyond the motion to dismiss stage.16 
III. MISLEADING IMPORT OF THE STATISTICS 
These numbers are misleading—perhaps for a surprising reason: 
They are artificially low due to the fact that plaintiffs today institute 
federal securities class actions against fewer types of defendants than 
prior to the PSLRA’s enactment.  As contrasted with the situation prior 
to that Act’s passage, federal securities class action complaints alleging 
fraud-based violations (namely, section 10(b) claims) currently often 
name only: (1) key executive officers (such as the chief executive 
officer, chief financial officer, and chief operating officer); (2) the chair 
of the board of directors; (3) the lead director and other outside directors 
who serve on key committees (such as the audit or compensation 
committee) whose alleged misconduct while serving as a committee 
member caused the improprieties; (4) the auditors (who certified the 
company’s financial statements); and (5) the underwriters (of a subject 
registered offering).17  Collateral actors—including attorneys, 
accountants (who have not certified financial statements), commercial 
and investment bankers (and their representatives), and consultants—
are named as defendants in these class actions on relatively rare 
occasions.18 
Consequently, although roughly 31% of securities fraud class actions 
in 2012 passed the motion to dismiss stage, fewer collateral defendants 
today are subject to section 10(b) liability exposure.  The answer 
 
16. Id. at 16–17.  Admittedly, these percentages add up to 98% rather than 100%.  Note that 
these percentages are taken from the NERA Review.  See id.  Irrespective of this seemingly high 
percentage of cases that result in dismissal, “over the last 17 years since the PSLRA became law, 
the annual rate of dismissals has never exceeded the rate of settlements.  In 2012, defendants 
settled 92 cases while achieving a dismissal of 72 cases.”  GIBSON DUNN, 2013 MID-YEAR 
SECURITIES LITIGATION UPDATE 4 (July 16, 2013) [hereinafter GIBSON DUNN UPDATE], 
available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2013-Mid-Year-SecuritiesLitigation 
Update.aspx. 
17. With respect to naming outside directors and certain executive officers who do not serve 
as directors, note that judicial rejection of the group published and collective scienter doctrines 
render it significantly more difficult for plaintiffs to name these fiduciaries in their class action 
complaints, particularly in view that all discovery ordinarily is stayed pending the court’s ruling 
on the motion to dismiss.  See supra notes 11, 13 and accompanying text; infra notes 19−23 and 
accompanying text.  Further note that section 10(b) litigation normally is pursued against 
directors, officers, underwriters, and auditors in a registered offering where the section 11 remedy 
is unavailable due to the tracing requirement.  See, e.g., Krim v. pcOrder.com, Inc., 402 F.3d 489, 
502 (5th Cir. 2005); infra note 44. 
18. Ordinarily, these collateral actors are named as defendants only if they themselves make a 
statement that is communicated to investors.  See infra notes 24−49 and accompanying text 
(discussing the impact of recent Supreme Court decisions). 
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explaining why this eventuality transpired is multifaceted.  Its sources 
are attributable to the PSLRA and the Supreme Court’s restrictive 
interpretations of the federal securities laws. 
IV. IMPACT OF THE PSLRA’S STAY OF DISCOVERY AND THE THREAT OF 
SANCTIONS 
As discussed earlier, the PSLRA ordinarily stays all discovery until 
and unless the claimants fend off the defendants’ motion to dismiss.19  
Without access to documentary materials, use of interrogatories, and the 
taking of deposition testimony, the plaintiffs’ task to plead fraud with 
the requisite particularity against collateral actors is difficult.  Also 
pertinent is that the prospect of sanctions being levied under Rule 11 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure20 for the bringing of unwarranted 
claims has been accentuated by the PSLRA’s mandate that the court, 
upon conclusion of the action, must review the parties’ and attorneys’ 
compliance with Rule 11(b) and impose sanctions for such 
noncompliance.21  The presumed sanction for filing a complaint that 
violates Rule 11(b) “is an award to the prevailing party of all attorney’s 
fees and costs incurred in the entire action.”22  In view of this reality 
and Supreme Court decisions discussed below that confine the section 
10(b) liability exposure of collateral actors,23 there frequently exists a 
strong disincentive to name collateral actors in securities fraud class 
actions. 
V. IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
Perhaps surprisingly, the hallmark Supreme Court ruling that 
significantly limited the liability of collateral actors in securities fraud 
actions predated the PSLRA.  In the Central Bank of Denver decision,24 
handed down in 1994, the Supreme Court overturned decades of lower 
court precedent to hold that aider and abettor liability may not be 
imposed in private section 10(b) actions.25  Applying a strict statutory 
 
19. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing the PSLRA’s requirements for 
discovery). 
20. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). 
21. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c) (2012). 
22. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 39 (1995). 
23. See infra notes 24−49 and accompanying text. 
24. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
25. Id. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In hundreds of judicial and administrative 
proceedings in every circuit in the federal system, the courts and the SEC have concluded that 
aiders and abettors are subject to liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.” (emphasis in original)).  
In the PSLRA, Congress made clear that the SEC may pursue aiders and abettors based on 
violations of the Securities Exchange Act.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78.  For a recent SEC enforcement 
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construction, the Court’s focus was on the scope of conduct prohibited 
by the language of section 10(b).26  Because collateral actors (such as 
attorneys, accountants, bankers, and brokers) frequently were named as 
aiders and abettors in securities fraud actions prior to Central Bank of 
Denver,27 their continued vulnerability in this context would depend on 
the parameters of section 10(b) primary liability as construed by the 
federal courts. 
The Central Bank of Denver Court provided a glimmer of hope to 
investors and the plaintiffs’ bar with the following admonition: 
The absence of [section] 10(b) aiding and abetting liability does not 
mean that secondary actors in the securities market are always free 
from liability under the Securities Acts.  Any person or entity, 
including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative 
device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a pu-
rchaser or seller relies may be liable as a primary violator under [Rule] 
10b-5, assuming all of the requirements for primary liability under 
Rule 10b-5 are met.28 
Invoking this language, plaintiffs asserted, with some success, that 
collateral actors who labored behind the scenes to orchestrate fraudulent 
schemes perpetrated by primary participants were themselves subject to 
primary liability under section 10(b).29  This success was relatively 
short-lived. 
In two separate decisions, handed down in 2008 and 2011, the 
Supreme Court eviscerated much of the thrust of its admonition issued 
in Central Bank of Denver.  In the first case, Stoneridge Investment 
 
action where the SEC emerged victorious in an action alleging aiding and abetting liability under 
section 10(b), see SEC v. Apuzzo, 689 F.3d 204, 214 (2d Cir. 2012).  For an article analyzing 
Central Bank of Denver and its ramifications, see Marc I. Steinberg, The Ramifications of Recent 
U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on Federal and State Securities Regulation, 70 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 489 (1995). 
26. 511 U.S. at 173–75. 
27. See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44–48 (2d Cir. 1988); Barker 
v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1986) (“In common with the 
other courts of appeals . . . this court has held that § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 establish liability for 
aiders, abettors, and conspirators.”); Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 
F. 2d 478, 484–85 (2d Cir. 1979) (discussing the liability and requisite intent of aiders, abettors, 
and conspirators); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879, 888–89 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
28. 511 U.S. at 191 (emphasis in original). 
29. See, e.g., Simpson v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(stating that a defendant employs a deceptive device within the meaning of section 10(b) if his/her 
role “has the principal purpose and effect of creating a false appearance of fact in the furtherance 
of a scheme to defraud”) vacated, Simpson v. Homestore.com, Inc., 519 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 
2008); In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 236 F. Supp. 2d 161, 174–77 (D. Mass. 2003) 
(finding that where a financial institution engaged in allegedly deceptive transactions as part of a 
scheme to defraud, private liability exposure exists under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c)). 
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Partners, plaintiffs alleged that Charter Communications and two of its 
customers/suppliers, Motorola and Scientific-Atlanta, had engaged in 
financial misconduct and, accordingly, sued Motorola and Scientific-
Atlanta as primary violators of section 10(b).30  Concluding that the 
investing public did not have knowledge of the allegedly deceptive 
transactions between Charter and the defendants, the Court ruled that 
the plaintiffs were unable to prove the requisite element of reliance.31  
As the Court reasoned: “[N]o member of the investing public had 
knowledge, either actual or presumed, of respondents’ deceptive acts 
during the relevant times [and that] as a result, [plaintiffs] cannot show 
a claim upon any of the respondents’ actions except in an indirect claim 
that we find too remote for liability.”32  Today, after Stoneridge, those 
collateral actors who direct or orchestrate a fraudulent scheme may be 
primarily liable under section 10(b) only if investors were aware of the 
subject collateral actor’s conduct.33  A consequence of Stoneridge is 
that collateral actors, who unbeknownst to investors orchestrate behind 
the scenes the perpetration of a fraudulent scheme, will avoid section 
10(b) primary liability.34 
Although Stoneridge was disappointing to investors, there remained a 
seemingly attractive rationale in the plaintiffs’ arsenal: namely, those 
collateral actors who knowingly drafted materially false disclosures in 
securities documents (such as offering materials)35 or who otherwise 
provided advice or direction in regard thereto were primary participants 
within section 10(b)’s scope.36  Although this rationale was rejected by 
 
30. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 152 (2008). 
31. Id. at 159–61. 
32. Id. at 159. 
33. See M.ARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 318 (5th ed. 2009) 
(“Clearly, after Stoneridge, such primary liability under Section 10(b) is viable only if investors 
knew (‘actual or presumed’) of the subject defendant’s allegedly deceptive acts.”). 
34. See, e.g., Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, 702 (7th Cir. 2008) (affirming the dismissal 
of claims against defendants because the facts did not support that the defendants should have 
been aware of control deficiencies or circulation fraud).  See generally Barbara Black, Stoneridge 
Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.: Reliance on Deceptive Conduct and the Future of 
Securities Fraud Actions, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 330 (2008) (discussing the scope of liability for 
violations of Rule 10b–5). 
35. See, e.g., Klein v. Boyd, No. 95-5410, 1996 WL 675554, at *27–28 (3d Cir. Nov. 19, 
1996), vacated for rehearing en banc, Nos. 97-1143, 97-1261, 1998 WL 55245 (3d Cir. Feb. 12, 
1998); Molecular Tech. Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910, 917–18 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding 
sufficient involvement by the drafter of a merger agreement to create a triable issue of fact 
concerning a Rule 10b–5 violation).  For court decisions prior to Janus Capital holding that 
drafters of disclosure documents were not subject to section 10(b) primary liability, see, e.g., 
Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 491–92 (4th Cir. 1991); Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 
1104, 1124 (5th Cir. 1988), rev’d on other grounds, 492 U.S. 914 (1989). 
36. See, e.g., SEC v. Wolfson, 539 F.3d 1249, 1260–61 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding liability 
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several lower federal courts,37 it was accepted by numerous other 
courts.38  In those latter jurisdictions, invocation of this rationale 
permitted plaintiffs to state primary section 10(b) claims against, among 
others, attorneys, accountants, and investment banks.39 
Subsequently, in a decision handed down in 2011, the Supreme Court 
in Janus Capital40 applied a narrow construction in defining the 
meaning of the word “make” for purposes of primary liability under 
Rule 10b-5(b) (which makes unlawful the making, directly or indirectly, 
of a material misrepresentation or half-truth with the requisite 
scienter).41  The Court held: “[T]he maker of a statement is the person 
or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including its content 
and whether and how to communicate it.”42  According to the Court, 
attribution of a statement to a collateral actor constitutes “strong 
evidence” that the statement was “made” by the actor to whom the 
statement is attributed.43  Although this attribution rationale may 
provide support for subjecting underwriters in registered Securities Act 
offerings to section 10(b) primary liability exposure,44 other collateral 
 
where the drafter caused misstatements and omissions to be made, knowing that the statements 
were intended to reach investors).  Most courts declined to recognize primary section 10(b) 
liability premised on the allegedly intentional rendering of deficient advice to issuers.  See, e.g., 
Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1207 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding no liability under 
section 10(b) for absence of reliance); Wright v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (finding a lack of assurances by defendant in a press release, thus concluding that 
defendant neither directly nor indirectly communicated misrepresentations to investors); Carley 
Capital Grp. v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1334–35 (N.D. Ga. 1988). 
37. See cases, supra notes 35–36. 
38. See cases, supra notes 35–36.  For a review of pertinent case law prior to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Janus Capital, see M.ARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: 
LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES § 10.03[2] (2012). 
39. See, e.g., Molecular Tech. Corp., 925 F.2d at 917–18 (finding sufficient involvement by 
the drafter of a merger agreement to create a triable issue of fact concerning a Rule 10b–5 
violation); sources cited supra notes 35–36. 
40. Janus Capital Fund, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011). 
41. Rule 10b–5(b) makes it unlawful for any person, using a means of interstate commerce, 
“[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading.” 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).  Hence, subsection (b) of Rule 10b–5(b) encompasses 
misrepresentations and half-truths.  Its scope does not reach pure omissions.  Omissions come 
within the scope of Rule 10b–5(a) and (c). 
42. 131 S. Ct. at 2302. 
43. Id. 
44. Accordingly, underwriters and placement agents who exercise control over the content of 
a company’s offering materials may be deemed to have “made” the allegedly materially false 
statements made therein.  See Scott v. ZST Digital Networks, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 2d 877, 889–91 
(C.D. Cal. 2012) (finding plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that defendant did more than prepare and 
assist with statements, but, in fact, “issued” them); In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., 846 F. 
Supp. 2d 828, 861–62 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (finding that a document stating the party was 
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actors (such as attorneys, accountants, and consultants), when they 
advise rather than themselves “speak” to investors, are unlikely to come 
within section 10(b)’s primary liability net.45 
As a result, such collateral actors ordinarily are subject to section 
10(b) primary liability exposure only when they make an affirmative 
statement to investors, such as the issuance of an attorney opinion 
letter,46 an auditor opinion in a prospectus or Securities and Exchange 
Commission annual report (Form 10-K),47 or a fairness opinion issued 
 
‘“specifically designated’ to make representations” concerning the document created a triable 
issue of fact concerning liabilities for any misrepresentations therein).  But see SEC v. Tambone, 
597 F.3d 436 (1st Cir. 2010) (en banc) (holding that SEC failed to allege officers “made” false 
statements of material fact under Rule 10b-5).  Note that, even in Securities Act registered 
offerings, section 10(b) is sought to be invoked in securities class actions (in addition to section 
11 of the Securities Act) due to two main reasons: the longer statute of limitations for section 
10(b) claims; and the onerous tracing requirements that must be met under section 11 for 
purchasers who acquired their shares in the secondary trading markets.  See Marc I. Steinberg & 
Brent A. Kirby, The Assault on Section 11 of the Securities Act: A Study in Judicial Activism, 63 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 26–27, 42 (2010) (discussing each of these limitations). 
45. See, e.g., SEC v. Garber, No. 12 Civ. 9339 (SAS), 2013 WL 1732571, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 22, 2013) (finding traders, rather than attorneys who issued advisory opinions, to be the 
“makers” of allegedly misleading statements); In re DVI Inc. Sec. Litig., 919 F. Supp. 2d 498, 
508 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (“Plaintiffs have not shown that the allegedly deceptive conduct was publicly 
disclosed and attributed to [the defendant].”); La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. KPMG, LLP, 
No. 1:10cv01461, 2012 WL 3903335, at *4–5 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2012) (finding defendants not 
liable for misstatements in a report absent other conduct).  As a generalization, after Janus 
Capital, the inquiry ordinarily focuses on whether a subject defendant-officer “made” the 
allegedly materially misstatement(s) under Rule 10b–5(b) or engaged in deceptive conduct 
coming within Rule 10b–5(a) and (c).  See, e.g., SEC v. Sells, No. C 11–4941 CW, 2012 WL 
3242551, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2012); Sawant v. Ramsey, No. 3:07-cv-908 (VLB), 2012 WL 
3265020, at *14 (D. Conn. Aug. 9, 2012); Haw. Ironworkers Annuity Trust Fund v. Cole, No. 
3:10CV371, 2011 WL 3862206, at *4–5 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 7, 2011); In re Merck & Co., Inc. Sec., 
Derivative & ERISA Litigation, No. 1658 (SRC), 2011WL 3444199, at *12 (D.N.J. Aug. 8, 
2011). 
46. See, e.g., Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1063 (9th Cir. 2008) (“An attorney who 
undertakes to make representations to prospective purchases of securities is under an obligation, 
imposed by Section 10(b), to tell the truth about those securities.”); Rubin v. Schottenstein, Zox 
& Dunn, 143 F.3d 263, 266–68 (6th Cir. 1998) (discussing attorney liability under Rule 10b–5(b) 
in making statements about their clients’ securities in connection with the sale of those 
securities); Trust Co. of La. v. N.N.P. Inc., 104 F.3d 1478, 1490 (5th Cir. 1997) (discussing 
misrepresentations made by an attorney that misled an investor); Kline v. First W. Gov’t Sec., 
Inc., 24 F.3d 480, 491 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Thus, this court has adopted a limited duty to investigate 
and disclose when, by the drafter’s omission, a public opinion could mislead third parties.”); 
Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 848 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding an attorney may be liable for a 
press release that misrepresented the negotiating position of the potential acquiror).  See generally 
M.ARC I. STEINBERG, ATTORNEY LIABILITY AFTER SARBANES-OXLEY §§ 2.05, 11.03 (2012). 
47. See, e.g., Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing liability of an 
accounting firm that allegedly certified misleading financial statements); McIntire v. China 
MediaExpress Holdings, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 2d 105, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that plaintiffs 
sufficiently pled that an independent auditor made false or misleading statements). 
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by an investment banker.48  In other contexts, unless a collateral actor 
(whose role is known to investors) orchestrates a scheme to defraud that 
goes beyond the representations communicated to investors,49 primary 
section 10(b) liability exposure will not prevail. 
VI. THE REST OF THE STORY 
In view of these legislative and judicial developments, it becomes 
clear why plaintiffs are bringing section 10(b) class action claims 
against fewer defendants.  While the enhanced pleading requirements 
mandated by the PSLRA annually result in dismissal of scores of 
securities class actions,50 this is only part of the story.  Additional 
developments discussed in this Article also play a major role in limiting 
available avenues of recompense for aggrieved investors.  When 
evaluated in conjunction with one another—the staying of discovery 
until and unless the motion to dismiss is fended off, the unavailability of 
the section 10(b) private remedy against aiders and abettors, and the 
narrow construction of the requisite conduct that subjects a collateral 
actor to section 10(b) primary liability exposure—the conclusion 
emerges that these developments adversely impact the quest of investors 
to hold those collateral actors perceived responsible for their financial 
losses to answer for the alleged misconduct.  To some extent, state court 
individual actions, state derivative suits, and state class actions 
(involving securities of enterprises that are not nationally traded) may 
be available against collateral actors.51  Yet, the availability of 
instituting an individual action in state court often is a reality only for 
those investors (e.g., frequently institutional investors) who have 
 
48. See, e.g., Hershkowitz v. Nutri/System, Inc., 857 F.2d 179, 184, 189–90 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(finding valid a jury instruction that provided liability for an investment banker rendering an 
opinion in connection with a merger). 
49. Accordingly, primary liability under Rule 10b–5(a) and (c) may be imposed “‘when the 
scheme  also  encompasses  conduct  beyond  those  misrepresentations’”  that  comprise  the  
Rule 10b–5(b) claim.  SEC v. Mercury Interactive LLC, No. 5:07-cv-02822-WHA, 2011 WL 
5871020, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011) (quoting WPP Luxembourg Gamma Three Sarl v. Spot 
Runner, Inc., 655 F.3d 1039, 1057 (9th Cir. 2011)).  See generally Andrew Gillman, Scope of 
Primary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Following Janus 
Capital Group, 40 SEC. REG. L.J. 269 (2012). 
50. According to NERA Economic Consulting, sixty securities class actions were dismissed in 
2012.  See NERA REVIEW, supra note 14, at 23.  Gibson Dunn reported that seventy-nine 
securities class actions were dismissed in 2012.  See GIBSON DUNN UPDATE, supra note 16. 
51. See discussion supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.  A recent example of such a case 
is the Mortgage Ltd./Radical Bunny state court litigation in which two prominent law firms 
settled the suit brought by investors by paying $88 million.  See Debra Cassens Weiss, Greenberg 
Traurig, Quarles to Pay $88M to Settle Suit by Mortgage Investors, A.B.A. J. (June 22, 2012), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/greenberg_traurig_quarles_to_pay_88m_to_settle_suit_b
y_mortgage_investors/. 
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suffered large financial losses.52 
Upon assessing the foregoing developments and their impact, it 
becomes clear that investors who seek recovery in a securities fraud 
class action are ordinarily relegated to suing certain select insiders and 
the auditor who certified the company’s financial statements.53  
Collateral actors who are blameworthy and who would serve as “deep 
pockets” to help compensate investors for their losses normally are 
outside the purview of section 10(b) private liability exposure. 
 
52. Clearly, the relatively small amount of losses that an ordinary investor may suffer when 
victimized by alleged fraud is not of sufficient monetary amount to incentivize that investor to 
incur the costs of bringing a lawsuit on his/her own.  That is a key rationale underlying the 
societal benefit of the class action mechanism. 
53. See discussion supra notes 2–51 and accompanying text. 
